On the Definition and Legal Status of Spacecraft by Verplaetse, Julian G.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 5
1963
On the Definition and Legal Status of Spacecraft
Julian G. Verplaetse
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Julian G. Verplaetse, On the Definition and Legal Status of Spacecraft, 29 J. Air L. & Com. 131 (1963)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol29/iss2/5
ON THE DEFINITION AND LEGAL STATUS OF SPACECRAFT
By DR. JULIAN G. VERPLAETSEt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE subject of this paper is limited to all artifacts, engines and ve-
hicles operating within the scope of outer space activity. Therefore,
all air-breathing and/or air-supported engines and vehicles do not form
a part of our research. Consequently, we do not consider any particular
forms of the type V-1 flying bomb, developed by the Germans during
World War II. This was a small low-winged craft, a kind of winged
torpedo, which could fly only at uniform speeds. Its drive was continuous
(the combustion process was uninterrupted during the whole period of
flight) ; therefore, it was restricted to a certain density which in turn
restricted it to a certain height, since its fuel was mixed with oxygen from
the airspace. Whereas by analogy, the German V-2, may show trends
toward protype spacecraft, while the V-1 flying bomb is definitely within
the pilotless plane class.
Some borderline cases, difficult to assign to either class, come readily to
mind. The most obvious example is the X-1 5. This American experimental
craft is released from an airplane at high altitude. As it soars upward it
brings its pilot to the upper fringes of the stratosphere and may soon be
able to enter the reaches of vertical space beyond (thermosphere or iono-
sphere). Since it is a winged craft most jurists have called it an aircraft.'
A. G. Haley sharply opposes this view, stressing that it has no air-breathing
devices and depends solely for its propulsive capacity on pure rocket power;
therefore, he claims that it is in fact a pure rocket.2 To be sure the whole
operation has a stark amphibious outlook; therefore, the right definition
may depend on the criteria adopted for the concept of a rocket vehicle
in general. This point will be further considered in the following ma-
t Max Planck Institut ftr Volkerrecht, Heidelberg, Germany. The author is very much indebted
to Professor John Cobb Cooper and Mr. Andrew G. Haley for their active support and sympathy.
He would also like to extend his thanks to Professor Machowski for suggestions relating to classi-
fication of spacecraft. For kind advice on technical matters, he owes thanks to: Mr. E. Rechlin
of the California Institute of Technology; Mr. G. P. Adair of Washington, D.C.; Mr. E. F. Grant
of the Hughes Aircraft Company, Aerospace Group; and Doctors Pickering and Home J. Stewart,
of the California Institute of Technology.
' E.g., Wolczek, First Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 115 (1958); McDougal & Lipson,
Perspectives for the Law of Outer Space, 1958 Am. J. Int'l L. 425; Quigg, Open Skies and Open
Space, 1958 Foreign Affairs 99; Lipson & N. de B. Katzenbach, Report to the National Astronautics
and Space Administration on the Law of Outer Space.
'Haley, in his comment on the Report of Lipson & Katzenbach (see supra note 1), included
in Survey of Legal Opinion on Extraterrestrial Jurisdiction, Third Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space 37 (1960), deems that the wings permitting temporary use for guidance are not
a determining factor. However, he asserts that if the X-15 is intended solely for use in the air,
then it is an airplane using rocket power. It would seem that he, in spite of his strong voiced
opinion, does not exclude the existence of amphibious types. See Haley, Rocketry and Space
Exploration 64 (1958), wherein he cites the case of the Natter, a half-missile, half-piloted air-
craft built in 1944 by the Germans. This was a liquid propelled craft, launched vertically by
four solid propellant boosters. The pilot rode forward of the short wings and the motor was
located in the aft portion of the craft. Both the pilot and the motor were parachuted after action.
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terial. A related problem, but in quite another context, is the air-scoop
filling station for spacecraft, which might be legally ambidextrous.'
II. GENERAL PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
In order to clarify concepts it is appropriate to outline the framework
of the operational field of the law of outer space. That framework is com-
posed of two elements: environment, or medium, and instruments.
Vertical space above land and waterspace of the earth is divided grosso
modo into the airspace governed by the law of the air, and outer space for
which new regulations are sought.
A spacecraft is any man-made craft capable of being used in outer
space activity.4 Spacecraft can be divided grosso modo into rocket vehicles
(the term missile is sometimes used interchangeably) and their payload,
of which the most usual subdivisions are manned and unmanned.! These
definitions are rough and general, and used herein for a broad purpose
without attempt at refinement or diversification. In particular we express
no opinion as to the limit between air and outer space or between zones
thereof.' Nor is any opinion expressed as to whether that part of airspace
in outer space activity belongs in the scope of air law or to the law of
outer space. The present view is that this subject is in conflict.! It should
also be pointed out that terminology is uncertain, and terms have been
used interchangeably in the past. For instance, an artificial satellite, put
into orbit by a rocket is a payload of that rocket, but this payload may
harbor a non-activated vehicle, which will be used as a rocket for a trip
from an outer space platform to the moon.
III. DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
A. Rocket Vehicles
There are two ways in which to approach the definition of a rocket
'On orbital air scooping vehicles see 6 Astronautics No. 8, 28 (Aug. 1961).
' Other definitions which have been advanced are: "Spacecraft means any craft capable of
orbital movement or of flight independently of action or reaction of the air, whether or not it is
carrying instruments of observation." The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Study
Group on the Law of Outer Space, Art. 1, Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of
Outer Space (1962); "flight craft may be applied to all devices capable of flying in flight space."
Cheng, International Law and High Altitude Flights: Balloons, Rockets and Man-Made Satellites,
1957 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 487, 490, based on John Cobb Cooper's definition of flight space as air
space coupled with outer space; "All craft that cannot derive support in the atmosphere from the
reactions of the air." Beresford, The Future of National Sovereignty, Second Colloquium on the
Law of Outer Space 5, 6 (1959); Rivoire, Design for a Law of Space, First Colloquium on the
Law of Outer Space, 100, 101 (1958) would apply space law to any craft beyond a 300 km
ceiling and to all satellized craft regardless of altitude; "Tout appareil capable de se dtplacer par
ses propres moyens aussi bien dans l'atmosph~re que dans la zone extra-atmosphtrique." Bornecque-
Winandye, Droit de l'Imp6rialisme Spatial 43 n.33 (1962).
"'The relationship between satellite rockets and ballistic missiles is so close that the over-all
construction, propulsion, launching and guidance techniques are almost identical." Haley, Rocketry
and Space Exploration 43. But see, Cocca, Derecho Interplanetario 163. A missile is more commonly
defined as a war instrument or a weapon. It is unmanned but not necessarily rocket propelled.
It is commonly described as an aerial vehicle, including only four of the six types later detailed:
surface-to-surface, air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air.
" The topic of the limit between air and outer space has produced a vast amount of literature,
while the topic of zones, layers or bands, has been strangely neglected.
'See, e.g., Verplaetse, Conflicts of Air and Outer Space Law, Third Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space 145 (1960); Meyer, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 193 (1963) stating that law
of outer space should be exclusive; Beresford, The Future of National Sovereignty, The Second
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 5, 6 (1959) would subject rockets to national air
sovereignty, being the more restrictive of the two legal regimes.
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vehicle, that is either through the medium of its activity or through the
nature of instrumentality. Some proposed definitions tend to join both,
in that they cling to the characteristics of the instrument, but would re-
tain under the jurisdiction of the law of the air those instruments that do
not exceed a certain height or those that do not exceed a certain speed.'
It is suggested that the environmental factor should not be stressed and,
above all, that prefixed altitudes should be avoided. Indeed, since the
question of determining a demarcation line between air and outer space
is not going to be solved in the near future, any solidification of the
matter might prevent agreement on the definition of rocket vehicle.
Another method of arriving at a definition has been suggested, that is
through the scope of its activity,' however, no delineation of that scope
is given or attempted here.
We would offer the following definition: A rocket vehicle is any appara-
tus projected through space," without support of medium," by the com-
bustion of fuel and reagents, without intake of oxygen, the latter being
carried, if needed, inside its body," and capable of taking aloft any kind
of load (capsule, ship, warhead, etc.)."
No technical or legal analogy is to be found for the rocket vehicle.
While some comparisons have been advanced, they are all negative. The
rocket cannot be compared to a plane, which in a technical sense is com-
pletely different." Hence, it would be adventurous to state that a rocket
vehicle is anything which does not correspond to the definition of aircraft,
as given by Annex A of the Paris Convention of 1919, and Annexes 6, 7
and 8 of the Chicago Convention of 1944. The difference lies in nature
and not in category. Nor can it be assimilated to a shell," or to the Ger-
man V-3 rocket of wartime memory.
Rocket vehicles may be classified according to various criteria, and
8 Cf. Rivoire, op. cit. supra note 4, who would by way of reciprocity, modify the definition of
aircraft as follows: "An aircraft will be any machine capable of keeping itself aloft in airspace.
Such a machine, however, will automatically cease to be considered as an aircraft when it rises
above the 300 km limit or when it begins to move on a continuous orbit." For a discrimination
along the lines of the speed of the escape velocity see Fonseca, Dynamic Limitation of the Freedom
of Space, Second Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 24, 25-26 (1959); see also 1962 Z.L.R.
274, where Dr. Rinck proposes exclusion from the definition all small rockets such as postal
rockets. But see, p. 280 n.5 of the Editor's annotation stating that such distinction would be
irrelevant as to the question of liability; Haley, Space Exploration-The Problems of Today,
Tomorrow and in the Future, The Second Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 2, 52 (1959)
wherein is described routes of postal rockets, some of which will reach an altitude of 1,000 miles
or more. It is obvious that such rockets cannot be excluded from the law of outer space.
Chaumont, Le Droit de l'Espace 65 (1960).
18 On the obvious differences between a rocket vehicle and a rocket motor see Haley, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 33 wherein he cites the Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration of
the House of Representatives.
"The fins of the X-15 and of the Dyna Soar X-20 would seem to serve the purpose of
guidance and not for support. Some other types of space craft will also be equipped with small
wings.
"This is a very distinctive characteristic of the rocket motor and vehicle. The rocket engine
is a jet engine, but it does not, as turbojets, ramjets or pulsejets, use the oxygen of the airspace;
it carries its own oxygen needed for combustion.
" Rockets without payload would have to be classified as rocket motors, not as rocket vehicles.
14 See Haley, op. cit. supra note 5, at 167; Aircraft is defined in Annex 7 of the Chicago
Convention as "any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of
the air."
"See Spaight, Air Power and War Rights 214; But see Haley, op. cit. supra note 5, at 36
wherein the differences are pointed out, that it constantly gains speed and its mass decreases during
every second of operation.
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these classifications will have an impact on the status of the vehicle. The
classifications are as follows:
1. according to fuel:1"





2. according to composition:
a. simple,
b. multistage;
3. according to ballistics or guidance:'
a. non-guided, with vertical or curved trajectory,
b. guided on whole or part of the trajectory, either by self-con-
tained navigation system or from the earth;
4. according to destination: 8
a. earth to earth,
b. earth to outer space,
c. outer space to earth,
d. outer space to outer space (from space platform or return),
e. air to outer space (from a balloon or plane),
f. outer space to air (retrieval by helicopter)
5. according to purpose:"
a. peaceful,
b. warlike uses;
6. according to ownership:
a. public (State, military, customs, police, international organiza-
tions),
b. private.
The latter classification finds a close analogy in the law of the air, and
also in maritime law. Indeed, Articles 30 and 31 of the Paris Convention
of 1919 and Article 3 (a) and (b) of the Chicago Convention of 1944,
contain that classical distinction. The Chicago Convention, which is only
applicable to private aircraft, establishes the dichotomy of State aircraft
and private civil aircraft. The distinction is important because of im-
munity. It should be added, however, that the Chicago Convention, un-
like its predecessor, the Paris Convention, does not provide immunity for
any type of State aircraft. Whether in matters of aircraft, immunity has
1'eSee Haley, op. cit. supra note 5, at 35, 265. The trend is to replace chemical fuel by
electricity, nuclear energy and solar radiation; see Finger, Managing the Nuclear-Rocket Program,
7 Astronautics No. 12, 18 (1962); Johnson, Nuclear-Rocket Applications, Id. at 22; Bussard,
Nuclear-Rocketry-The First Bright Hopes, Id. at 32. On electric spacecraft see 7 Astronautics
No. 6 (1962); 6 Astronautics No. 1. 30 (1961). On the projects of solar power see Gold, Solar
Power in Space, 6 Astronautics No. 2, 34 (1961).
" This is a problem of paramount importance and it was recognized as such during experiments
in World War II. See Feuchter, Geschichte des Luftkrieges 384, 411; on the subject generally see
Hobbs, Basics of Missile Guidance and Space Techniques. London, N.Y. 1959. 2 Vols.
58 Javitch, Some Rules Regulating Earth to Earth, Space to Earth and Earth to Space Missiles
and Interplanetary Vehicles, Second Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 61 (1959). The
author seems to consider as an important characteristic of the spacecraft its high velocity. Any
velocity higher than 4000 mph would make any transport engine from earth to earth a spacecraft.
" This point is also of importance. At present the Russians classify reconnaissance satellites
as warlike, or at least as peace time espionage, while the Americans classify them as peaceful
instruments.
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become a customary rule of international law is at least doubtful." Since
nearly all spacecraft, up to now, have been State-owned or State-con-
trolled, an elucidation of this point will be further attempted.
Next to classification, the time element may have an impact on status.
There are currently three phases: boost or launching phase; air and outer
space flight, up and downward; and eventually, re-entry phase. From the
timing viewpoint it is clearly apparent that no rigid separation of air and
outer space activity exists. Air enters unavoidably into outer space ac-
tivity at the boosting phase as a passage zone in the course of flight (with
the corresponding problem of innocent passage)"' and at the moment of
re-entry-e.g., the descent of the capsule by parachute.
In the future there will be a need to look for different definitions of
different types with their time incidents. However, it would be premature
to drive particularism that far. Progress is so vertiginous that each launch-
ing indicates the need for changes and improvements, 2 therefore, it is
advisable to keep within general headlines. One of the points, however,
that must be taken into account, in the future, is the concept of desti-
nation; sky-bound and earth-bound vehicles may be governed by different
principles concerning matters of liability and retrieval.
B. Payloads
Payloads may be manned or unmanned" and both categories may be
subdivided into a variety of uses: communications, meteorology, intelli-
gence, photography, scientific, military, etc. Payloads may be further sub-
divided on an ownership basis into: national-international, State-private,
etc. 4 It should also be noted that when the payload is composed of a
charge of explosives it is called a warhead.
20See Verplaetse, International Law in Vertical Space 77 (1960).
25 Art. 4-1 of the Draft Code of the David Davies Memorial Institute provides:
No spacecraft launched from the territory of any State may at any stage of its
flight enter the airspace of another State without the consent of that State; provided
that a. such consent shall not be withheld if prior notice has been given to that
State of the intended flight, and it has been shown to its satisfaction that the flight
is solely for scientific and peaceful purposes . . .
Professor D Goedhuis in his Report to the International Law Association at Brussels, (1962)
contends that the United Nations Resolution of December 20, 1961, proclaiming that outer space
and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States, implies the right of innocent
passage through airspace for those purposes. See also his Report to the Netherlands Society of
International Law (Dec. 1962). See also Becker. US Foreign Policy for Outer Space, 1959 JAG J.
4, 29: "so long as they are not equiped to inflict injury or damage, they do not infringe the
right of the States." This position is stated with respect to outer space, however it must have an
impact on the passage of spacecraft through the airspace.
22 Cf. Haley, op. cit. supra note 5, at 167: "As the science itself is new and constantly changing,
so is the industry that supports it."
" This distinction is made by: Machowski, Dainer, Saporta, Levitt, Cheng and Regala. See
Machowski, The Legal Status of Unmanned Space Vehicles, The Second Colloquium on the Law
of Outer Space 11, 113 (1959). This distinction, which is similar to that of piloted and pilot-
less aircraft under Art. 8 of the Chicago Convention of 1944, is rejected by Kovalev and Tcheprov
(Na Pyti Kosmitcheskomy Pravy 82 (1962)) on the basis that it follows too closely the analogy
of the law of the air and that both types provide equal sources of danger. This controversy,
however, does not deal with the whole problem, as manned may mean not only the crew but
the passengers as well. In the future distinctions will be necessary, although manned-unmanned
may be insufficient.
24 The first case of a private satellite was the Tellstar communications satellite. See Zhukov,
Problems of Space Law at the Present Stage, Fifth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 25
(1962) wherein the author has correctly stressed the importance of its impact on matters of
law and cooperation in outer space.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
1. Circumterrestrial Spaceflight
Zadorozhnii has shown that movement in exoatmospheric space is not
the only, and perhaps not the main characteristic of the artificial satellite.
The main difference with air activity is that the earth turns inside the
orbits of the satellite and that attraction of the earth is reduced to a
dwindling effect. The earth escapes constantly under the orbiting ve-
hicle." For a definition we would suggest the following: an artificial
satellite of the earth is a man-made celestial body circling the earth at
a rim of attraction by means of the cinetic energy combined with the
gravitation of our planet without essential propulsion of its own.
No technical or legal analogy is available in our quest for rules on
the artificial satellite; however, some comparisons have been advanced.
The satellite vehicle has been compared to: a balloon, a rocket, an island,
a ship, a plane, a meteorite, and a bottle in the sea. It is submitted that
none of these comparisons have an exclusive value; however, each may,
in turn and for some purposes, be helpful in certain situations. At the
present time, some combination of these comparisons based on the different
types of satellites would offer the best approach to the problem. It stands
to reason, for instance, that if the orbiting satellite is shaped in the form
of a space station or a space platform, it would look more like an island,
while a small experimental satellite, doomed to disintegration after a few
orbits, comes closer to the bottle in the sea comparison, or juridically, to
the res derelicta.
2. Cislunar Spaceflight
A moonprobe is any payload intended and built to explore the moon,
either by way of orbit, fly-by or hard landing thereon. The latter is some-
time called a moon messenger.
A moonship is a man-made space craft intended and built to make a
soft landing on the moon. There are various types of moonships en-
visioned at present. For example, some see a moonship intended to depart
from the earth, make a soft landing on the moon, then eventually return
to earth, while others see a moonship built on a space station, intended
to depart therefrom, make a soft landing on the moon, then eventually
return to its launch station.
These types are fundamentally different, particularly in regards to the
launching phase, as launching from a space station or platform requires
much less power. Dr. Wernher Von Braun, who is the protagonist of
space platforms, calls any ship departing therefrom a long distance
spaceship.
3. Interplanetary Spaceflight
A spaceship is any man-made contrivance intended and built to operate
beyond the earth's attraction, without essential propulsion of its own. In
the distant future it might become convenient or necessary to distinguish
the Mars-ship, the Venus-ship, etc., from other spaceships.
The problems that arise in this area are very similar to those relating to
rocket vehicles. However, with spaceships the question of return to earth
should be dealt with in three phases: departure from outer space, re-
"'See Zadorozhnii, Osnovnii Problemi Nauki Kosmitcheskevo Prava, Kosmqs i Mezdunarodnoe
60 (1962).
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entry-with or without stopping, and landing-which includes the aspect
of retrieval.
Any further cosmic activity can be left for future generations. In-
tragalactic spaceflight to the other stars of our Galaxy, or intergalactic
spaceflight to other Galaxies, would have to use ion or plasma rockets or
electro-magnetic propulsion.
IV. LEGAL STATUS
No one would dream of granting a status to such unimportant vehicles
as motor-cars or to such short-lived objects as shells or rounds hurled
through space. But a territory, person, ship, or plane is the seat of a bundle
of rights and duties which makes the conferring of a status on that
object natural and imperative. In matters of spacecraft, the policies and
liabilities involved are so considerable that the legal regulation has to
be built around the nucleus of the permanent character or status.
A status implies a double-headed constitution. On the one hand the
status passivus, which means that the spacecraft will have to abide by
the regulations of the authority conferring the status. On the other hand
is the status activus, which means that the spacecraft is entitled to the
protection of the authority conferring the status.
Questions pertaining to the bundle of rights and duties include: inci-
dents of ownership, liability for damage, right of retrieval, etc." All these
questions are dealt with in other chapters of the law, but those chapters
presuppose the settling of the matter of status upon which rights and
duties might be predicated. Some of these questions can be touched upon
here by way of example. If the spacecraft is State-owned and State-con-
trolled-this includes almost all craft launched to date-the question of
immunity will play a major role.' On the question of liability, it must
be determined upon what basis, fault or risk or a combination of both,
liability is to be placed. Security for damages will certainly be more than
in the law of the air, which is at present a thorny item. Insurance will also
require determination, as to what kind of insurance, if any, could or
should cover liability. It must also be determined if international co-
operation in that area is necessary and whether or not such cooperation
would be feasible. The problem of jurisdiction, both substantive and ad-
" More detailed problems would include: the right of destruction, in order to avoid space
being cluttered with derelicts, see Jenks; The International Control of Outer Space, Third
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 3, 9 (1960); Are space vehicles property of the country
of origin even if they land in a foreign State? Are they to be considered as res derelicta, as
meteorites, etc.? See Machowski, op. cit. supra note 23, at 111. According to our view this
question can be answered in one single solution; see Verplaetse, op. cit. supra note 20, at 339; the
diversion or capture of artificial satellites. According to scientific advice this is not possible at the
present time; however, some of the information received indicates that it may be possible in the
future.
2 See Verplaetse, op. cit. supra note 20, at 158, 160. It would not seem proper to grant any
measure of immunity to rocket vehicles and moon probes. Artificial satellites, moonships and
spaceships might be granted a certain functional immunity. However, as far as it can be forseen
at the present time, it would not be advisable to extend that immunity to the function of liability.
On the latter point see 1962 Z.L.R. 270. See also Schicks, Who Rules the Skies: Some Political
and Legal Problems of the Space Age, Institute of International Studies, 1961, where the author
pleads for: "a liberalization of the prevailing rules of international law with regard to military and
other public aircraft . . . if these rules are to be applied to space vehicles." Poulantzas purposes inter-
nationalization and demilitarization of all artificial satellites by suggesting analogy with public or
State ships. However, such position is not free from contradiction, see The Legal Status of Satellites,
14 Rev. Hillinique de Droit Int'l 225 (1961).
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jective, must also be solved in the future. The law applicable, both out-
ward and inward, to spacecraft will bear to a variegated extent the im-
print of status. Concerning venue, if the craft is State-owned and State-
controlled, no action can be brought in courts of other States and,
generally speaking, an action can not even be brought in the State's own
courts. For the solution of this problem it has been suggested that an
international court be set up as the proper forum to entertain such ac-
tions. However, past experiences would offer little hope that the various
States would agree to such a solution.
Having thus determined the requirement of status and its related prob-
lems, the question arises as to who will confer the status or to whom will
the status be connected. There are two ways of connecting the status: with
the authority clinging to the engine, or with the authority clinging to the
launching site. In both cases authority may be either national or inter-
national. In the past all authority concerning spacecraft has been na-
tional, but nothing would prevent the use of engines belonging to an
international organization or authoriy, as well as the possible creation of
international launching sites.
Should authority be connected with the launching site, various situa-
tions would have to be considered, such as the location of the launch site,
whether it was on land, on the High Seas (Sea Dragon concept), in the
air (balloon, plane) or in outer space (space platform).
The simplest approach to the problem is to connect all spacecraft,
whether rocket vehicle or payload, with the authority to which they be-
long, that is if they belong to a national State they would have the status
of that State. Should they belong to a citizen of that State, it would still
be a matter of that State's authority to confer the status. If the spacecraft
belongs to an international organization or authority, it would be interna-
tional and subject to such authority.
Rockets and payloads, at present, have to fly the colors and carry the
identification marks of the initiating authority." However they should be
registered with an international administrative body, and it would be most
desirable for such a system to be agreed upon. 9 It must be pointed out
that international registration of aircraft is not authorized under the
Chicago Convention."° Therefore, international registration of spacecraft
is not at present a reasonable expectation. 1 In the past, States have acted
" See Valladao, Direito Interplanetario e Direito inter Gentes Planetarias, 15 Revista juridica da
Faculdade Nacional de Direito da Universidade do Brasil 25 (1957) calling for the use of a double
emblem, that of Earth and of its Nationality. On the question of importance and conditions of
nationality in matters of spacecraft see Chaumont, op. cit. supra note 9, at 69.
" Cf. the regulation of the topic by the Draft Code of the David Davies Memorial Institute,
wherein Art. 5.1 provides: "Every spacecraft shall be registered . . . with the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space." Art. 5.3 provides: "For all purposes including
that of any claim concerning the activities of a spacecraft: a. every spacecraft . . . shall be
deemed to have the nationality . . . of the State responsible for its launching and b. through out
its life shall, with its component parts, so long as they are identifiable, be deemed . . . the property
of the State concerned .... " Art. 5.4 provides: "No spacecraft shall be operated by private
persons or corporations save by licence granted by the State of which they are nationals. Any
such licence shall include the provisions of Section 3, 6, 7 and this section as part of its terms."
It is submitted that the terms of these provisions are clearly too general.
"o Art. 77; see Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed by the ICAO Council, 27 J. Air L.
& Com. 290 (1960).
as Jenks, International Law and Activities in Space, 1956 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 99, would require
consent of the United Nations; McDougal & Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space,
1958 Am. J. Int'l L. 430, would require inspection or control by an international organization.
These suggestions are not practical at present.
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in jealous independence and secrecy and under the present circumstances,
information of launchings to the United Nations, was the best that could
be achieved.
This approach, however simple it might seem, does not cope with the
entire situation. a Furthermore, even if we accept the simple connection
with the proper authority as a basis, the interference of a connection with
the launch site is not altogether excluded. This is all the more true since,
according to scientific advice, human judgment is definitely a factor in
guidance.
In some cases the law of the State will have to be taken into consideration.
The law of the launch site is definitely not an outsider since rockets and
ballistic missiles are integral with their launching site.3" This is one of the
major distinctions between the rocket and ships and aircraft. One type
of rocket is bound to one type of launcher. The huge array of launching
is really part of the launched body, making it dependent upon its site.
For instance, the activities, concerning launchings, of the European
Space Organization (ESO) and the European Launcher Development
Organization (ELDO) will be conducted, beginning in 1965, by launch-
ing European spacecraft from the Woomera Range in Australia. The
impact of the launching site on status or on the incidents of status is
obvious. However, the situation will depend to a great extent upon
whether Australia cooperates with the European Organizations, or whether
a mere use of the Australian facilities is contemplated. Generally in such
cases, an international agreement would provide for a certain amount of
regulation.
The concurrent importance of instrument and launching site is further
complicated by the conflict between the law of the air and the law of
outer space. While a spacecraft is crossing the airspace should it be con-
sidered a pilotless aircraft for which, according to Article 8 of the
Chicago Convention, a special authorization, for each flight, of the State
overflown is necessary? The answer should be in the negative, as the
general analogy of spacecraft and aircraft must be rejected.34 In any event,
Article 8 does not apply over the High Seas nor over terra nullius.
No conflict with the Chicago Convention is possible so long as space-
craft are designated State-craft. Theoretically, it might be questioned
whether State aircraft, as defined in Article 3 (c) of the Chicago Con-
vention, have to be qualified as aircraft in general, that is, in conformity
with the Annexes, or whether, under these circumstances Article 3 (c)
also includes other flight instrumentalities. However, it is submitted that
in either case the Chicago Convention is out of the picture. In reference
to the Annexes, spacecraft are excluded. In the second situation, State
spacecraft are excluded from the Convention pursuant to Article 3 (c).
In conclusion, artificial satellites and spaceships will require different
legal treatment. Combined launchings from the earth and from outer
" E.g., the distinction made by Danier between satellites that would pass over the territory
of all States, and those gravitating at a radial speed synchronized with the Earth's rotation, thus
keeping their position above the same geographical compound.
" Technical advice on this point is rather confusing; however, it would seem that, except
for inertial systems, the launching arrays are very particularized.
a4 Woetzel, Die Internationale Kontrolle der hheren Luftschichten und des Weltraums, 1951
Diss. Bonn 65 without argument, deems Art. 8 of the Chicago Convention applicable.
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space are a prelude to great enterprises. Conflicts with intersidereal con-
ditions and bodies of law may appear. It is at this point that the general
terms and concepts of the law of outer space will split into different fields
of the law. That, however, is music for the future.
